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Abstract
Loyalty programs are widely used by firms but their effectiveness is subject to debate.
These programs provide discounts and perks to loyal customers and are costly to administer,
and with uncertain effectiveness at increasing spending or stealing business from rivals. We use
a large new dataset on retail purchases before and after joining a loyalty program (LP) at the
customer level to evaluate what determines LP effectiveness. We exploit detailed spatial data on
customer and store locations, including locations of competing firms. A simple analysis shows
that location relative to competitors is the strongest predictor of LP effectiveness, suggesting
that LPs work primarily through business stealing and not through other demand expansion.
We next estimate what variables best predict LP effectiveness using high-dimensional data on
spatial relationships between customers, the focal firm’s stores, and competing stores as well
as customers’ historical spending patterns. We use LASSO regularization to show that spatial
relationships are more predictive of LP effects than are past sales data. Finally, we show
how firms can use this type of predictive analytics model to leverage customer and competitor
location data to substantially increase the performance of their LP through spatially driven
targeting rules.
Keywords: Loyalty programs, predictive analytics, spatial models, retail competition, machine learn-
ing
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1 Introduction
Loyalty programs are now prevalent in many industries. The loyalty programs as marketers know
them today originated in the airlines in the 1980s and have since permeated industries such as
hotels, casinos, retailers, grocery stores, and restaurants, among others. The pervasiveness of
loyalty programs is partly due to their flexibility in how they can be structured (e.g., earning rates
and rewards) and managed for strategic decisions (e.g., targeting to increase customer engagement).
In spite of the popularity of loyalty programs with firms, their effectiveness at increasing profits
has long been subject to debate. This debate has centered on the costs of giving discounts and perks
to the most loyal customers, as well as the costs of administering the program itself, and whether
these costs are justified by increases in spending by those customers. Loyalty programs have the
potential to increase profits by increasing switching costs for existing customers, stealing business
from rivals, or through second degree price discrimination. They may also indirectly increase profits
by increasing customers psychological perceptions of the firm, by generating customer data that can
be used for targeted promotions or CRM, or by exploiting agency issues such as flights booked by
business travelers and paid for by their employers (Dreze and Nunes (2008), Roehm et al. (2002),
Verhoef (2003), and Shugan (2005)).1
Empirical studies of whether loyalty programs actually do increase profits have found mixed
results. Verhoef (2003) finds that the effects are positive but very small, DeWulf et al. (2001) finds
no support for positive effects of direct mail, Shugan (2005) finds that firms gain short term revenue
at the expense of longer term reward payments, and Hartmann and Viard (2008) found no evidence
that loyalty programs create switching costs.
In this paper, we consider whether and when loyalty programs are profitable and to what
extent this profitability results from stealing business from rivals or increasing overall demand via
one of the mechanisms described above. We approach this problem in a novel way using a large
and detailed dataset on retail spending. We observe spending before and after customers join a
loyalty program and exploit variation across markets with different levels of competition and types
of competitors. This comparison can be made at a granular level using detailed information on
customer and competitor location. By measuring how total spending changes at the customer level
for customers facing different local competitive structures we can observe, for instance, if customers
1For a more complete review, please see Bijmolt et al. (2011), Liu and Yang (2009), and McCall and Voorhees
(2010)
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in more isolated markets change their spending or if they merely start receiving discounts on their
purchases and how this differs in highly competitive markets. This type of variation can help resolve
the question of when LPs are profitable and to what extent do they work through business stealing
versus other demand expansion.
We use a large and detailed dataset that results from merging credit card spending data with
customer data from a leading retailer to show that the local competitive structure is more pre-
dictive of how customers respond to joining an LP then are their historical spending patterns. In
particular, an individual’s spatial relationship with competitor stores is the main determinant of
LP effectiveness in simple comparisons. This suggests that the loyalty program is working through
business stealing and does not otherwise raise demand. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to
explicitly link the competitive structure of a market with the performance of a loyalty program.
While model-free comparisons suggest spatial competitive structure is the crucial determinant
of LP effectiveness, the full relationship is likely to be highly complex. To capture the complex
spatial relationship between the customer, focal firm, and competition, we estimate the relationship
between the change in spending (conditional a customer on joining the LP) and a very large number
of variables on purchase data and spatial relationships with competitors at the individual level.
This estimation is essentially a prediction problem with a very large number of potential predictive
relationships. Our estimation procedure therefore combines LASSO regularization with a selection
correction approach to allow for many potential variables and to infer the true impact of spatial
structure and other variables on loyalty program performance.
This estimation serves two purposes. First, it validates the descriptive result that spatial com-
petitive structure is a stronger predictor of LP effectiveness than are past spending patterns or
other RFM variables. Second, we then use the output to show how firms can take advantage of this
insight and leverage customer and competitor location data to increase the performance of their
LP through spatially driven targeting rules. Because location and travel costs form an important
part of preferences over retailers, this can be thought of as a strategy for targeting price discounts
on observable preference heterogeneity. The variation across customers in the profitability of their
joining the LP is large, with 49.1% of joiners resulting in a net loss to the firm, suggesting the gains
from improving targeting can be quite high. We find that, consistent with the spirit of recent work
in targeting (e.g., Ascarza (2018)), firms should focus on the customers who are more “spatially
vulnerable” relative to the competition and avoid promoting the LP to customers who, for example,
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have limited access to their competitors.
The field of economics, and then later marketing, has a long history of incorporating location
effects, dating back to the study of how location with respect to competitors determines market
power (e.g., Hotelling (1929)), including empirical studies of how firms strategically employ and
respond to spatial differentiation (Seim (2006), Davis (2006), Thomadsen (2007)). This includes
research studying how market characteristics influence a firm’s price and promotion activity (Hoch
et al. (1995) and Bronnenberg and Mahajan (2001)).
Recent work has explored the benefits of geotargeting, where promotion or other marketing
activity is a function of a customer’s real-time location using mobile data (Luo et al. (2014), Chen
et al. (2016)). Fong et al. (2015) and Dube et al. (2017) have also considered “geoconquesting”,
where the marketing activity focuses on instances when the customer is located near a competitor
as opposed to near the focal firm. This literature is limited, but potential gains from geoconquesting
are especially likely when the marketing activity is based in part on business stealing, as it is for
loyalty programs. One contribution of this paper is to point out the potential gains from orienting
promotional activity towards geoconquesting, even in a non-mobile setting.
While the previous literature therefore incorporates select spatial components, mostly it does
not fully account for the complex customer-store-competitor spatial relationship. In prior work,
competitor information is often integrated into models through simple customer-store or store-
competitor distance metrics, thereby eliminating the possibility of complex spatial analyses. Beyond
complex spatial analysis alone, the interplay between the competitive structure and loyalty program
effectiveness has not yet been explored.
We also contribute to the study of competitive promotions and competitive price discrimination.
Price discrimination strategies such as loyalty rewards should never lower profits by a monopolist
but in oligopoly settings this is no longer true as firms may face a prisoner’s dilemma (Shaffer and
Zhang (1995)). Chen et al. (2001) shows that when individual targeting is possible but imperfect,
it can soften price competition among competing firms, but as targeting precision increases the
prisoner’s dilemma reasserts itself. Ultimately then, it is an empirical question whether and when
targeted price discrimination can increase profits. Previous work has shown that in practice the
benefits of using targeted pricing can be quite high (Rossi et al. (1996), Besanko et al. (2003)). Li
et al. (2018) specifically consider competitive price discrimination across markets and show that
the profitability of tailoring prices to local markets depends on both the local market structure and
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competitive intensity across markets. Our analysis also considers local market structure but with
price discounts in the form of a loyalty program that can be targeted at the individual level.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data on retail sales
histories and competitor and customer locations. Section 3 provides model free evidence that the
spatial competitive structure surrounding a customer is the key determinant of LP effectiveness.
Section 4 describes a LASSO estimation of the complex interaction between competitive structure
and LP effectiveness and then uses this result to form a potential targeting strategy. Section 5
discusses managerial implications and avenues for future research.
2 Data
In this section we describe the customer transaction data, competitive location data, and provide
an overview of the spatial metrics used to characterize the competitive structure.
2.1 Transaction Data
The transaction data comes from a Fortune 500 specialty retailer, one of the 10 largest retailers in
the U.S. This data is highly detailed: we observe the full basket of purchases from 10,029 customers
between March 2012 and March 2014. These sum to over 2.4 million SKU level purchases across
897,819 store trips. On average, each customer has about 90 trips across nearly five different store
locations through the two year observation period, spending about $110 per store visit, and traveling
about 5.7 miles.
Customers 10,029
Date range March 2012 to 2014
Avg. trips/customer 90
Spend/trip (net, after discounts) $110.18
Average # of locations visited 4.7
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Crucially for this analysis, individuals are identified through their credit card rather than a
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loyalty program card. This allows us to observe transaction activity both before and after the
customer joins the loyalty program. We also observe all marketing activity for these customers
through the firm’s email campaigns: over 900,000 emails were sent to about 39% of the customers
and 11% of the customers received promotions specifically encouraging enrollment in the loyalty
program.
Importantly, the data also contains the customer’s location and the latitude/longitude of each
of the firm’s store locations, which provides us with a complete picture of all customer interactions
with the firm across different store locations as well as the specific products purchased at each store
location over time.
We further take advantage of a unique feature of this loyalty program in that the program
discounts are earned and applied on only a single large category of the firm’s goods. We label this
a limited loyalty program to emphasize the distinct structure. As requested by the firm providing
the data, we cannot disclose the type of goods subject to discounts. However, because this firm
competes with both generalists, who also sell a large variety of categories, and specialists, who
only sell the products in the specific category the LP applies to, this feature provides an additional
lever with which to study the interaction between competitive structure and LP effectiveness. It
also allows us to study whether and when the loyalty program causes spillovers into other category
purchases.
2.2 Competitor Data
The competitor data contains the locations of four primary competitors of interest, who were
selected based on discussions with the focal firm. The four competitors (see Table 2) vary in both
size and product breadth. Competitor #1 is a big box store with a wide product variety (BB). The
remaining three competitors are small-box stores. Competitor #2 and competitor #3 offer a wide
assortment of products (SB1 and SB2), whereas competitor #4 specializes in the product category
for which the limited loyalty program applies (SS).
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Competitor Reference Footprint Product Breadth
#1 BB Big-Box Wide
#2 SB1 Small-Box Wide
#3 SB2 Small-Box Wide
#4 SS Small-Box Specialized
Table 2: Competitor Types
The variety in the size and product breadth allows us to compare how the impact of the compet-
itive structure might be competitor or type specific. More importantly, it allows us to gain insight
into the extent of category-level versus store-level business stealing.
The latitude and longitude locations of each competitor are collected from the Google Maps
API. We first pulled all competitors within a 30 mile radius of each of the focal stores, and then
pulled all competitors within 30 miles of each customer located within a 30 mile radius of each focal
store. This expanded footprint ensures that our definition of the competitive structure is customer
centric rather than limited to the perspective of the focal store.
2.3 Quantifying the Competitive Structure
Our analysis measures and highlights the impact of the complex spatial relationship between the
customer, the focal store, and the competitors on customer behavior and ultimately firm profits.
Quantifying this relationship in such a way to accurately reflect the tradeoffs that an individual
likely encounters when deciding which store to visit requires several complex considerations.
A common approach in quantifying competitive structure is to simply use the distance between
a focal store and the customer along with the distance between the competitor and the focal store
(or more commonly still, an indicator variable if they are both within, say, a 5 mile radius of the
focal store). The drawback of this approach is that it does not jointly consider the customer-store-
competitor location, resulting in a potential homogenization of very distinct competitive structures.
This limitation is illustrated in Figure 1: two competitors, C1 and C2, and a customer, I, are
positioned near the focal store S. Both competitors are nearly the same distance to the store, but
their respective relationships to the customer and the focal store are considerably different. The
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customer has to pass by the focal store in order to visit the first competitor, C1, which suggests
some spatial advantage for the focal store. However, the second competitor, C2 is positioned right
next to the customer, acting as a convenient alternative to the focal store. One goal of this analysis
is to incorporate these complex spatial structures into the manager decision process, a strategy that
has heretofore been ignored in the analyses of loyalty program effectiveness.
S
C1
C2
I
Figure 1: Limitation of Radii Approach
We recognize that it is unreasonable to expect a single metric to capture the complex nature of
the spatial relationship between the customer, focal store, and competitor in its entirety. Instead,
we approach the problem by proposing a large number of distance metrics, each of which captures
at least some of the complex spatial relationship on its own, and then in our empirical analysis
uncover which metrics or which interactions between metrics best characterize customer behavior.
By honing in on the right combination of distance metrics we can determine which specific features
of the spatial relationship influence customer behavior the most.
We therefore consider standard distance metrics between each customer and competitor with
the the focal firm in addition to the following:
• How much closer is the focal store to the customer, relative to the competitor?
• How sparse is the focal store and competitor, relative to the customer?
• Are the focal store and competitor in the same direction from the customer, and to what
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extent?
We also allow for interactions between population density and distance metrics to incorporate
the difference in transportation costs between urban and rural areas. For brevity, the complete
description of the distance metrics considered are contained in the appendix.
3 Spatial Competitive Structure and LP Performance
We first provide model free evidence that the spatial competitive structure, and hence business
stealing, are key determinants of LP performance. Our analysis focuses on two metrics of LP
effectiveness: the probability that a customer joins the program, and the change in average monthly
spend for customers who decide to join. Here and throughout the paper, we use the change in
spending net of the LP discounts. For customers who join the LP but do not change shopping
patterns, this change is negative by default because of the discounts and a positive change for this
metric can therefore be taken as strictly beneficial for the retailer. In this section we look at how
these metrics relate to the the distance between the customer and the focal store and the four
competitor types.
One challenge in analyzing LP effectiveness is that the customer’s decision to join the loyalty
program may be related to unobserved heterogeneity. While we observe purchases both before and
after each customer joins the LP, which allows us to condition on individual-level fixed effects, it is
still true that if customers join due to anticipated changes in their level of spending, the estimated
change in behavior attributed to the loyalty program may be over-estimated. We accommodate
this possibility in three ways. First, we assume that the location of each customer is essentially
exogenous prior to joining the LP, in which case the difference in spending across customers with
respect to the spatial relationship between the customer, the focal store, and the competition still
provide valid comparisons. Second, when we estimate a full model of the LP in the following
section, we use exclusion restrictions combined with a control function approach to account for
this unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we replicate our results using only spending that does not
qualify for the LP discounts and is thus not potentially biased by selection on unobservables.
Descriptive Analysis:
We first examine the role of competitive structure on LP effectiveness in a transparent model-
free comparison. We calculate the average probability of customer joining and the average change
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in monthly spending under four possible competitive structures (as illustrated in Figure 2): (1)
when the focal store is within five miles of the customer and the competition is not, (2) when both
the focal store and the competition are within five miles of the customer, (3) when the competition
is within five miles of the customer and the focal store is not, and (4) when neither the focal store
or the competition are within five miles of the customer.2
Table 3 shows average outcomes in each competitive structure. For customers relatively close to
the focal store (regions 1 and 2), the change in spending after joining the LP is significantly higher
than for those who are not located near the focal store (regions 3 and 4). Customers in regions 1
and 2 increase their spending by $22 per month compared to essentially no change in spending for
customers in regions 3 and 4.
Interestingly, for customers in region 1 (that is, when the focal store is relatively isolated), the
probability of joining the LP is the highest, but the change in spend at these stores for customer
that join the LP is negligible. This is intuitive: if there are no relevant competitors nearby it is
likely that the focal store already has the majority of this customer’s share of wallet.
However, in the second region when the customer has access to both the focal store and the
competition, the change in spend is very high at $80 per month. These customers may have been
splitting their purchases across stores and consolidate activity to the focal store upon joining the
loyalty program. Customers in this region are driving the entire result that customers near the
focal store significantly increase their spending. This is true despite the fact that they represent
under one quarter of the customers near the focal store. A naive analysis of spatial effects that
compared customers in region 1 + 2 to those outside it would miss this distinction.
Region 3 stands out as an outlier in the opposite direction. This region has the smallest share of
customers, and those customers have the lowest sales pre LP, the lowest join rate, and display a large
negative change in spending after joining. This change is almost entirely in non-qualified spending
and this group also exhibits a large decrease in trip frequency after joining. One interpretation is
that customers located near a competitor likely join the LP after the decision has been made to
shift non-qualified spending to the competition, and use the LP solely for the qualified spending
discounts. They then shop at the focal store much less often and only for the qualified category.
2To be clear, a single focal store can be in multiple categories, since it depends on the relationship with respect
to the individual.
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Figure 2: Competitive Structure Illustration
Region Pr(Join) ∆ Sales|Join ∆ Non-Qual Sales|Join n Join ∆ Trip Freq
1+2 4.2% $22 $13 429 -0.05
3+4 4.0% -$2 -$24 487 -0.01
1 4.2% $4 -$7 328 -0.13
2 4.1% $80 $79 101 0.22
3 3.6% -$85 -$82 87 -0.67
4 4.0% $16 -$11 400 0.13
Table 3: Region Effects
To understand what is driving these findings we break down the results by competitor type.
Figure 3 shows the average change in monthly spending, and how it varies by both competitive
structure and type of competitor. As shown previously, the largest gains are when both the com-
petitor and focal store are near the customer, which presents the most likely scenario for business
stealing opportunities. This change is also largest when the competitor is the big-box generalist,
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suggesting this is the most profitable firm to steal business from.
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Figure 3: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitor Type
To better understand this mechanism, recall that the LP only applies to a specific large category
and not all products, and that one of the competitors (SS) specializes in selling only that category.
We thus highlight the portion of change in spend that occurs in the LP category of interest.
Figure 4 shows how spending changes across competitor types within each region for this category.
Interestingly, the changes are driven in large part by purchases outside of the category for which the
loyalty program applies. If there was no spillover effects of the loyalty program, we would expect
zero change in purchases that will not impact the LP rewards. Upon joining the LP, customers may
decide to consolidate purchase behavior with one store rather than cherry picking rewards from the
focal store (in the qualifying category) and continuing with the same purchase patterns at other
stores in the non-qualifying categories.
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Figure 4: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitor Type and Purchase Category
4 LASSO Regularization and Competitive Targeting
In this section we propose an approach that accounts for the complex spatial interaction of compet-
itive structure on LP effectiveness. This serves two purposes. First, we can analyze the estimation
results directly to evaluate the relative importance of competitive structure and traditional predic-
tors of LP effectiveness like sales histories as well as simple measures of customer location. Second,
the estimation provides a ready-made targeting strategy for a firm seeking to improve LP effective-
ness by providing predictions of which customers are the most profitable to target based on their
spending histories, precise locations, and unique competitive structures. The wide variation across
customers in profitability suggests the gains from targeting the program can be quite large.
We combine two stages of estimation to estimate the impact of the competitive structure on
customer behavior. First we model the probability that a customer joins the firm’s limited loyalty
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program, conditional on the competitive structure. Then, we model the change in spending con-
ditional on participating in the LP in addition to the competitive structure. We estimate in two
stages to allow the competitive structure to influence the join probabilities and changes in spend
differently, and to control for self-selection into the LP.
The goal of the estimation is to predict which customers are likely to be profitable as members of
the LP based on their past sales and spatial characteristics. Because the goal is prediction and the
data are high-dimensional, the problem is well-suited to statistical methods built around dimension
reduction or “regularization.” We ultimately use a LASSO approach because this will allow us to
test inclusion of a large number of possible spatial measures and let the model select the most
predictive variables. The output also provides a clearer interpretation than other methods and one
goal of the analysis is to assess which individual factors best predict LP effectiveness.
4.1 First Stage: Probability of Joining and Selection Bias
Let the indirect utility of joining the firm’s loyalty program for customer i at focal store s be
uis = β
′Xis + δ′Zis + εis (1)
Here X contains all the distance metrics (specific to each customer-store combination) and
Z contains firm-level marketing and store-specific customer purchase behavior. Xis contains the
competitive structure parameters between customer i at focal store location s. These metrics are
intended to jointly capture the complex spatial relationships between the customer, focal store, and
competitors. Since there can be more than one focal store in the vicinity of an individual, these
metrics vary across each store s for a given individual i. Likewise, since each customer’s location is
unique, the spatial metrics also vary across each individual i from all observations for store s.
β reflects the impact of the competitive structure on an individual’s likelihood of joining the
program. We avoid specific interpretations within this vector of coefficients (e.g. representing the
cost of transportation) and instead interpret the coefficients as holistically capturing the many
spatial factors that a customer considers before committing to the firm’s loyalty program (e.g.,
convenience of the focal store relative to the competition, isolation of the focal store, distance to
the store versus other competitors, etc.).
Zis includes traditional RFM variables along with basket specific metrics: monthly trip fre-
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quency, overall sales, distinct number of items, number of product categories, basket size, discounts
received, sales in the category of interest, and sales in the category of interest for those products
that are included in the limited LP. In preparation for our second stage model on the change in
monthly spend, we also include variables in Zis that will be used to control for selection bias, dis-
cussed in further detail below. Zis therefore contains proportion of sales in the category of interest,
an indicator for whether the customer received marketing activity specifically encouraging joining
the LP, and an indicator for whether the customer received any marketing promotion.
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, these variables need to influence the probability of joining
the loyalty program but not influence the change in spending upon joining the program. We argue
that these variables satisfy the exclusion restriction, primarily because our dependent variable is
the change in spend with the focal store, rather than spend alone. While these variables could be
correlated with spending levels, it is unlikely there is a relationship between these Z variables and
change in spend upon joining the LP other than through the direct effects of the LP.
δ captures the effects of the marketing and past purchase behavior on the utility received from
joining the loyalty program. For instance, if a large proportion of spend is already dedicated to the
category for which the LP benefits, it seems natural that the customer would be more inclined to
join the LP.
The error term εis captures the idiosyncratic variation in utility across customers and stores.
Assuming the {εis} are independent and identically distributed Type I extreme value, we can derive
the join probabilities as follows:
Pr (ji = 1|Xis, Zis, β, δ) = exp (β
′Xis + δ′Zis)
1 + exp (β′Xis + δ′Zis)
(2)
where ji = 1 if customer i joins the limited loyalty program at some point during the observed
data.
4.2 Second Stage: Change in Spend
In the second stage we model the change in monthly store-level spend, conditional on joining the
loyalty program. Let yis be the change in monthly sales for customer i at store s. We model this
relationship as:
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yis = γ
′Xis + κ′Z∗is + φ (pˆis) + ηis (3)
where ηis is an unobserved, normally distributed random error centered at zero. Here Xis is
defined in the same way as in the first stage model and Z∗is is the same as Zis but with the three
selection variables removed. We predict changes in store-level spend (rather than changes in firm-
level spend) to recognize that changes may be dependent on the spatial relationship a customer has
with an individual store’s location. In other words, the change in spend for an individual customer
may depend on which specific competitors are located in the vicinity of a given store location.
A common issue in analyzing the effectiveness of loyalty programs is that of self-selection.
Individuals are not randomly assigned to participate in loyalty programs, rather they choose to
be in the loyalty program for a variety of reasons. Because of this self-selection, estimates of LP
effectiveness may be upward biased. For example, those who join are more likely to spend more,
regardless of whether they are in the LP or not, so comparing the spending amounts of those who
join with those that do not capture differences in spending patterns, not the effectiveness of the LP.
We are able to mostly eliminate this concern using data containing spending both before and
after the customer joins the program. While this captures most unobserved heterogeneity, there
is still potentially the issue that the customer may have joined because of anticipated increases in
spending over time. As with before, this may lead the analyst to incorrectly believe that the loyalty
program is causing a large increase in spend when the change may have been due to this unobserved
heterogeneity.
We employ a Heckman-style two-stage correction method in an attempt to correct any remaining
selection bias. First we estimate the join probabilities using the first stage specification above,
including variables that serve as plausible exclusion restrictions. Then, we take the estimated join
probabilities for each observation and include them in the second stage model of change in spend as
a control function. Our approach is to place a flexible function φ over pˆ using high-order polynomials
to control for unobserved heterogeneity.3
3See Heckman (1979) for an introduction to the two-stage estimator and Ahn and Powell (1993) for extensions to
more flexible selection correction functions. For a recent application, see Ellickson and Misra (2012).
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4.3 LASSO Estimation
Our proposed model contains a large number of spatial variables defined to capture the competitive
structure. On the one hand, capturing the spatial relationship between the customer, focal store,
and competitors is complex and may require many variables. However, all else being equal a concise
model is preferable from a managerial standpoint. In addition, many of the spatial metrics we
devised may be redundant or highly correlated with each other. To systematically remove variables
that are either unnecessary or redundant we employ the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection
Operator (LASSO) estimator, introduced by Frank and Friedman (1993) and Tibshirani (1996).
In general, for a model with a k-dimensional parameter vector θ the LASSO method performs
the following:
(θ∗) = arg min
{
− logL (θ) + λ
∑
k
|θk|
}
(4)
Where L is the likelihood of data given the model specified, and λ is a tuning parameter that
represents the penalty incurred if we choose a nonzero value for any parameter θk. This approach
regulates the trade-off between an accurate model with more predictive power and a concise model
that is more readily interpretable by managers.4 We select the tuning parameter λ through ten
fold cross-validation, which is perhaps the simpliest and most widely used method for this task.5
4.4 Estimation Results
The results from the LASSO estimation are presented in Table 4. For model validation purposes,
we split the original data into a 75% training set and 25% test set. The results presented below
were estimated using the training set alone. For brevity, the table only displays variables that
are significant in at least one of the two models (with the exception of the coefficients on the
control function polynomials). First we discuss how the competitive structure influences the join
probabilities before discussing the estimated impact on the change in monthly spending, as both are
4An alternative approach would be a ridge regression or similar method. In this case the penalty is applied more
smoothly, shrinking coefficients on highly correlated variables towards each other. We prefer the LASSO approach
because the penalty structure removes coefficients entirely, resulting in clearer model interpretation. Specifically, we
can see that many non-spatial variables will drop out altogether. This direct interpretation of the model’s results is a
key output of interest. A ridge regression would lack this clean interpretation but would result in similar quantitative
predictions and can be provided upon request.
5See James et al. (2013) for more information.
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influenced differently. From a statistical standpoint, it is relatively easy to interpret the marginal
effects of each the variables. However, we must emphasize that many of the spatial impacts are
codependent and interpreting the marginal effect of one coefficient while holding another spatial
variable constant is sometimes impossible. Later, we present stylized heatmaps to better understand
the impact of the spatial relationships on change in spend.
4.4.1 Join Probabilities
The logistic regression results are shown in Table 4, and the full list of spatial variable definitions
is provided in Table 7. In this first model many of the traditional distance metrics drop out of the
model (e.g., direct distance between the focal store and the customer) in favor of secondary spatial
metrics.
For instance, as the angle between the big box competitor (BB) increases, the probability of
joining the LP at the focal store also increases. This indicates that the probability of joining
increases if the competitor is in the opposite direction relative to the customer, rather than in the
same direction. This effect also holds for the small box specialist (SS).
The last two sets of spatial components (ccbar and icbar) are designed to account for differences
in markets with the presence of multiple competitors of the same type. The first of these variables,
ccbar, is the average distance between each competitor and its competitive center (defined as
the average latitude and longitude across competitors of the same type). A relatively high value
indicates that the competitors are relatively spread out in a market. The negative coefficient on
the big box generalist (ccbar_1) indicates that the more dispersed these stores are in a market,
the less likely the customer is to join the LP. The second variable, icbar, measures the average
distance between each customer and each of the competitors. While a customer may be close to
the competitive center, a high value of icbar indicates that each individual competitor (of a given
type) is still relatively far away. This coefficient is positive for the two small-box generalists (SB1
and SB2), suggesting that a relatively sparse distribution of these competitors may be beneficial to
the focal firm.
Finally, we consider the variables used to correct for potential selection bias. First, we see a
strong positive effect on the proportion of sales in the category of interest: customers who dedicate
a greater portion of store spend to the LP category are more likely to benefit from the LP discounts.
There is also a positive impact of whether or not they received a marketing promotion, both general
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emails and those specifically designed to enroll them in the LP.
4.4.2 Change in Monthly Spend
In this section we now review the influence of the competitive structure on the estimated LP
effectiveness, as measured by change in monthly spending at the focal store, conditional on joining
the firm’s loyalty program. Before discussing the spatial effects, we first review the results from the
selection correction. To correct for selection bias, we include up to the sixth order polynomials on
the predicted join probabilities from the previous stage. In our original LASSO regularization none
of these variables were significant, suggesting that selection resulting from unobserved heterogeneity
is not a substantial driver of the change in spending. However, in the results presented we explicitly
incorporate these variables at the cost of out-of-sample performance in order to properly control
for potential selection on unobservables.
Recall the dependent variable in this estimation is the change in monthly spend after joining the
loyalty program, net of any LP discounts. For this table, we only included customers who had at
least some spending both before and after joining. Since we are interested in how spending changes
after joining, rather than whether spending occurs or not, this seems to be a reasonable filter.
First, there is a positive impact on the squared distance between the customer and the focal
store, suggesting that the greater gains come from those located further away from the focal store.
This aligns with our previous intuition: customers located near the focal store are more likely to
already dedicate the majority of their spend with the focal store, so the potential for increases in
spend are limited, relative to those who are further away and thus more likely to be sharing spend
with the competition.
Importantly, the distance between the customer and the competition also influences changes in
spend at the focal store. Customers who exhibit the largest changes in spend are those who are
relatively far from the the big-box generalist (ic1sq) and the second small-box generalist (ic3sq)
and close to from the other competitors, holding all other variables constant.
Many of the radius band coefficients drop out of this model. However, we see that the intercept
angle is retained. The difference in the estimated change in spend for a customer where a big-box
(BB) competitor is in the same line of travel as the focal store (intercept angle of zero) versus in the
opposite direction (intercept angle of 180 degrees) is about $125, holding all other variables constant.
This is a non-trivial amount that cannot be captured using traditional spatial measures. However,
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it is important to again point out that many of these distance metrics cannot vary independently
of others. The heatmaps presented later will illustrate the degree to which the intercept angle
influences the change in spend while simultaneously accounting for other changes.
Finally, population density along with its interactions with the direct distance measures has a
significant impact on the change in monthly spend. On its own, the effect is positive: more densely
populated areas are associated with a greater change in spend. This is intuitive as more densely
populated areas tend to have a greater level of competition and higher incomes. There are also
numerous interactions with our simple distance metrics. For instance, increases in the distance
between the store and the customer influence customers in dense areas more negatively, relative
to customers in less dense areas. This appears to be capturing the challenges of traveling in more
densely populated areas (e.g., traveling a given distance in a city versus a rural setting).
As an important robustness check, we also include a column where the estimation proceeds as
before but only using the change in spending on products that do not qualify for the LP discounts.
Recall that the specific concern regarding unobserved heterogeneity was a correlation between
decision to join the LP and planned changes in spending over time related to the LP discounts.
Because these discounts do not apply to the non-qualified categories, the concern about unobserved
heterogeneity does not apply here either. Comparing this column and the column for all spending
shoes a very high correlation in the LASSO coefficients and perfect correlation in which variables
are retained. This adds further evidence that selection on unobserved heterogeneity does not have
a meaningful effect on our results.
4.4.3 Summary
The LASSO results suggest that the customer behavior appears to be influenced by the competitive
structure of the local market. The regularization tends to keep quite a few of the spatial metrics,
suggesting that relatively simple distance metrics are, on their own, unable to fully characterize the
predicted behavior. This is not very surprising: there are many intuitive reasons why a customer
may change their spending patterns after joining a loyalty program with respect to their location.
4.5 Visual Representation of Results
Even after variable reduction via LASSO, it is still difficult to interpret the spatial forces at play
strictly from coefficients due to their codependency. We therefore visually illustrate some of the
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Table 4: Lasso Pr(Join) and Change in Sales|Join
Coefficient Pr(Join) Change in Sales|Join Change in Non-Qualified Sales|Join
1 (Intercept) -3.5018 -19.3914 -44.8786
2 sisq 0.0042 0.0149
3 ic2 0.001
4 ic3 0.0054
5 ic1sq 0.2113 0.2076
6 ic2sq -0.1402 -0.1407
7 ic3sq 0.146 0.135
8 ic4sq -1e-04 -0.1257 -0.0991
9 sc1 0.0026
10 sc1sq 1e-04 -0.0207 -0.0237
11 sc2sq -0.0453 -0.0284
12 sc3sq -0.1096 -0.1168
13 sc4sq -1e-04 0.1089 0.0917
14 s4 -0.302
15 nAll_1 0.0225
16 n1_1 0.683
17 n3_1 0.1946
18 n5_1 0.1593
19 n10_1 -0.0474
20 n15_1 0.0514
21 nAll_2 -0.0014 0.4925 0.4141
22 n1_2 -0.2532
23 n10_2 0.0332
24 n15_2 -0.0158
25 nAll_3 -0.0141
26 n1_3 0.2901
27 n3_3 -0.0033
28 n5_3 -0.069
29 n10_3 0.0579
30 nAll_4 -0.0077
31 n3_4 0.1371
32 n15_4 -0.0044
33 cInt1: BB intercept angle 0.0013 0.692 0.752
34 cInt2: SB1 intercept angle -0.2691 -0.2939
35 cInt3: SB2 intercept angle 5e-04 0.53 0.5497
36 ccbar_1 (avg. BB-BB comp. center km) -0.0126
37 ccbar_2 (avg. SB1-SB1 comp. center km) 0.0097 1.2723 0.8758
38 icbar_2 (avg. customer-SB1 km) 0.0036
39 icbar_3 (avg. customer-SB2 km) 0.0039
40 icbar_4 (avg. customer-SS km) -1e-04
41 Prop. of sales in LP category (pre LP) 5.7842
42 Received promotional email 0.0762
43 Received promotional email for LP 1.3227
44 Trips/month 0.0106 -27.3642 -25.6736
45 Total sales (pre LP) 2e-04 0.0066 0.0017
46 Total sales in LP category (pre LP) 0.0353 0.0136
47 Total qualified sales in LP category (pre LP) -0.1075 -0.0428
48 Number of focal stores w/i 60km 0.0035 1.059 1.0569
49 Population Density (in sq miles) 0.0279 0.0251
50 Population Density x si -0.0019 -0.0017
51 Population Density x ic1 -0.0019 -0.0018
52 Population Density x ic2 -6e-04 -9e-04
53 Population Density x ic4 0.0036 0.0036
54 Population Density x sc1 -2e-04 -3e-04
55 Population Density x sc2 0.0014 0.001
56 Population Density x sc3 -7e-04
57 Population Density x sc4 -0.002 -0.0021
58 distinctSKU -0.0055 -0.8616
59 numItems 0.0019 -4.3895 -3.9053
60 distinctCategories -0.0989
61 poly(phat,1) -617.5849 -382.4511
62 poly(phat,2) 4871.7517 4215.9458
63 poly(phat,3) -4705.8528 -4272.9904
64 poly(phat,4) -3849.4443 -3371.5503
65 poly(phat,5) 432.9157 467.4562
66 poly(phat,6) 4049.8262 3559.0346
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LASSO’s results on how the competitive structure influences LP effectiveness. To do so, we show
the predicted change in spending for hypothetical customers and represent the results in a series
of heatmaps showing different competitive structures. These maps show how there is large hetero-
geneity across different customers with different competitive structures in the potential gains from
having them join the LP.
Six heatmaps are presented in Figure 5. The color on the heatmap reflects the estimated change
in spend from a customer in that position if they were to join the focal store’s loyalty program.
Heatmaps (a), (b), (c), and (d) illustrate the differences between the four competitor types, keeping
the relative position between the focal store and competitor the same. The fifth heatmap (e), plots
all four competitors on a single map, each an equal distance from the focal store. Finally, the last
heatmap (f) draws a random observation from the data to illustrate the predicted effects from an
actual competitive structure. Since these maps are mostly stylized representations of the actual
data we focus on comparing the magnitudes across maps rather than specific prediction levels.
In the first heatmap (a), the greatest change in sales is from customers who are located in
between the big-box generalist (BB) and the focal store, suggesting that changes in spend are
primarily driven by shifting store spend away from the competition. The second heatmap shows
a slightly different pattern. First, we notice that the overall magnitude in predicted changes is
reduced, suggesting that any potential gains from the first small-box generalist (SB1) are relatively
limited. Here again most of the gains are coming from those directly between the focal store and
competitor, but unlike the big-box store there is not as stark of a dropoff in spend once customers
move outside of the direct path between the focal store and this competitor.
For the second small-box generalist (SB2), the effect appears to mimic the first competitor
(BB) at a slightly reduced magnitude. Again we see the strongest gains from those located directly
between the focal store and competition, but this slowly drops off as customer move further outside
of the direct line of travel.
In the fourth heatmap (d), the small-box specialist (SS) displays a pattern unique to the other
three competitors. Recall that this competitor specializes in selling the same products that qualify
for the focal store’s loyalty program. In this map customers located near the competitor exhibit the
lowest changes in spend. This suggests that taking business from this competitor may be difficult
if the focal customer are located nearby.
The fifth heatmap, (e), combines all of the competitors to illustrate the relative influence simul-
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taneously. This shows that most of the gains are from customers near the big-box generalist, and
less so from the small-box specialist. This map highlights that the value of a potential customer is
heavily dependent on the extent to which the focal store can steal business from the competition.
Finally, the last heatmap presents the predicted change in spend from an actual market structure
in the data. Customers located on the far side of the second small-box specialist (SB2), and the
big-box generalist (BB), have the lowest predicted change in spend. These customers are relatively
far away from the focal store with a competitor directly in their path of travel, resulting in limited
predicted gains. On the other hand, the other two competitors (SB1 and SS) are relatively close
and the line of travel is not as critical with these competitors. The customers that show the most
promise are those that are relatively close to the focal store but in the direction of the second small
box generalist (SB2) and the big-box generalist (BB). To be clear, this will not necessarily always
be true: the positioning of the competitors relative to the focal store (or their absence from the
market) dictates which customers are likely to contribute to the greatest changes in spend once
they join the loyalty program.
The heatmaps presented highlight two key advantages of this analysis. First, the geographic
influence of a competitor is relatively complex. Simple radii surrounding either the competitor or
the focal store may not sufficiently capture the influence of the competitive structure on customer
behavior. Second, these complex relationships are not fixed and can vary by the type of competitor
in an area. This is an important consideration for the firm in the formation of targeting strate-
gies: the combined relationship between the location of each competitor, customer, and focal store
strongly influences the customer’s interaction with the focal firm.
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(f) Random Selection From Data
Figure 5: Change in Monthly Spend by Competitive Structure
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4.6 Competitive Targeting: Out of Sample Validation
In this section we use the LASSO results to form a targeting strategy designed to improve LP
profitability. The goal is for the firm to take advantage of detailed data on customer and competitor
locations to precisely target customers who are likely to be most profitable to join the LP. The
estimation in the previous sections allows us to predict change in spending for each potential
customer as a function of their location and proximity to each store type.
To evaluate the potential increase in profits from this type of targeting, we use a validation
or holdout sample of customers who joined the LP but were not used in estimation. For each we
predict their change in spending using the estimates.
For simplicity, we allow the firm to target at the customer-store level. Our dependent variable
of interest is the expected change in monthly spending. We then target all the customers at
stores whose predicted incremental profits from joining the LP is positive. Finally, we measure
the success of each targeting approach by calculating the actual change in spending from these
customers. Importantly, none of these observations were used to estimate the LASSO regression
presented earlier.
Rule-of-Thumb Targeting Strategies:
The performance of the spatial LASSO strategy is compared to numerous other potential tar-
geting strategies and the results are shown in Table 5. We first describe a series of simple targeting
strategies that are not based on the full competitive structure but instead rely on simpler spatial
information or more traditional RFM metrics. The mass marketing strategy simply targets all
customers. In aggregate, they show a positive change in monthly spending after joining.
We also consider targeting only those that exhibit relatively high spending amounts (prior to
joining the LP) at a few reasonable cutoff points (based on the empirical distribution of monthly
spend). We consider three levels as a cutoff: $80 (the median level of monthly spend), $100, and
$200 (about the 75th quantile of monthly spend). In each of these the change in monthly spend
actually declines substantially. Targeting high-spending customers to join the LP is therefore a
highly unprofitable strategy.
We also consider a naive location-based targeting strategy that targets all customers within
a few kilometers of the focal store. If we limit the targeting to only those customers within 5
kilometers of the target store we get a small positive boost, but even this is not as strong as a mass
marketing approach.
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A second type of naive location-based targeting would be to take advantage of the business
stealing aspect of loyalty programs by targeting all customers located near a competitor. We test
this strategy and find that targeting all customers within 5 km of a competitor would result in a
substantial decrease in profits.
Model-Based Targeting Strategies:
Next, we consider a series of targeting strategies based on models designed to predict changes in
spending. We compare a series of models distinguished by how they are estimated and which data
we use as inputs to estimate them. First is a naive spatial model that only considers the distances
between the focal store and customer, and each of the four competitors. As with the LASSO model,
this naive model is estimated on the training observations and validated on the holdout set. We
see that the actual change in spend is only slightly positive, and worse than a mass marketing
approach.
The second model considers only historical sales information: proportion of sales in the category
of interest, overall sales, category level sales, and category level sales that specifically qualify for
the LP. This model also underperforms a mass targeting strategy and actually results in negative
profits from targeting.
Finally, we show results for our spatial LASSO approach. It outperforms all other targeting
strategies in the validation sample, with the predicted actual change in sales roughly 9 times higher
than that of a mass marketing targeting scheme. These results are generally consistent with the
predictions from all observations, not only the ones from customers who end up joining the LP.
One argument might be that since marketing is done via email and is relatively inexpensive,
why not simply send marketing campaigns to everyone? The key here is that in some cases it
might be preferable to limit LP enrollment to certain individuals. While the firm cannot prevent
interested customers from joining its loyalty program, it can choose to whom it promotes the
program. Carefully targeting the right type of customer for this type of promotion can substantially
increase its profitability. While this has generally been known, we show two distinct contributions.
First, targeting based on location substantially outperforms targeting based on historical sales
patterns. Second, simply incorporating traditional spatial metrics like distance between customer
and store does not capture the complexity of competitive structure. Instead, we show how firms can
take advantage of rich spatial data on both customers and competitors locations using a machine
learning approach. This is particularly true for loyalty programs, which rely at least partially on
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business stealing to be effective.
Avg. ∆ Sales Avg. ∆ Non-Qualified Sales
Targeting Strategy in-sample out-of-sample in-sample out-of-sample
Mass Marketing -$18.69 $6.91 $-24.32 $2.59
Top spender (>$80) -$83.07 -$38.10 -$88.18 -$33.29
Top spender (>$100) -$95.38 -$45.16 -$99.92 -$40.19
Top spender (>$200) -$181.13 -$103.67 -$178.76 -$95.73
Within 5 kilometers of focal store $46.60 $12.60 $38.86 $13.23
Within 5 kilometers of any competitor -$47.57 -$54.54 -$53.00 -$41.93
Naive spatial $40.72 $3.97 $55.13 $11.21
Historical sales only $29.06 -$23.06 $28.96 $15.58
Spatial LASSO $84.03 $65.69 $77.61 $51.31
Table 5: Targeting Validation Performance
4.7 Spatial Variable Contribution
In the previous section, we accentuated the value of integrating spatial information into the pre-
dictive targeting process. In this section we provide an additional measure of the contribution of
spatial variables to the model fit relative to other types of variables. Specifically, we highlight that
our spatial metrics contribute substantially more towards R2 relative to traditional variables.
Table 6 presents the model fit using our two dependent variables of interest, where each row
represents a single subset of the available variables. The first column displays the pseudo-R2 from
a logistic regression and the second column the standard R2 from a linear regression. The variables
are separated into one of five labels: our proposed spatial metrics, RFM (trip frequency and sales
information), basket composition (number of items per basket, distinct items, distinct categories,
and discounts received), selection variables (proportion of sales in the category of interest and the
two marketing indicators), and finally the control function polynomials from the predicted LASSO
join probabilities.
The spatial metrics explain considerably more than any of the alternative variable types. The
sum of the R2 values across the partial models is similar to the fit from the aggregate model
in the final row. This suggests that the variable types tend to be relatively orthogonal to each
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other. In other words, the spatial information appears to be adding a non-trivial amount of unique
information to the model that would otherwise be absorbed into the residuals.
A natural rebuttal to this table is that the results are driven simply by the sheer number of
spatial variables relative to the other variable types. This is only partially true: recall that all of
the spatial metrics are derived solely from the latitude and longitude of the focal store, competition,
and the customer. From a managerial perspective it is very easy to recreate the diverse set of spatial
metrics once these few location points are obtained. In this sense, it is more the variety among
the spatial variables we designed, rather than simply the number of variables, that contributes a
substantial amount of information to each model.
Variable Type Pr(Join) ∆ Sales|Join
Spatial 3.4% 14.9%
RFM 0.6% 9.8%
Basket composition 0.0% 3.7%
Selection 1.4%
Control function polynomials 0.8%
All variable types 5.2% 27.1%
Table 6: Pseudo-R2 and R2 by variable type
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Both academics and managers have been interested in measuring the factors contributing to a
successful loyalty program. We argue that a significant but largely overlooked driver of a loyalty
program’s success is the joint relationship among the focal firm’s stores, the competition, and the
customer, or what we collectively label the competitive structure.
We find strong model-free evidence that this is the case, and then proceed to model the full
relationship. Doing so faces two challenges. First, we recognize that customers may self-select into
loyalty programs (e.g., an individual joins in anticipation of a large change in spend). We mitigate
this issue by utilizing flexible control function approach, a common strategy for this situation. The
second, and more substantive, obstacle is that of incorporating complex spatial information into a
parsimonious modeling approach. Rather than focus on specifying the "correct" functional form
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we adopt a LASSO approach to determine which, of many, spatial components are most strongly
related to changes in spending patterns.
Our results indicate that the competitive structure plays a substantial role in predicting 1)
whether or not a customer joins the loyalty program and 2) the extent to which spending changes
after joining the LP. Since the location of any individual customer is effectively exogenous with
respect to the focal store and the competition, the combined variation in the customer, focal store,
and competitor locations across observations allows us to infer precisely how the spatial information
influences spending patterns at the individual level. While we cannot prove with our data, we posit
that many of the patterns observed can be attributed to business stealing. For example, most of
the large increases in spend come from customers located directly between the focal store and a
competitor, suggesting that customers consolidate purchase activity across stores once enrolled in
the loyalty program.
We then illustrate how the model can be used to improve targeting decisions. Because the
profitability of a customer joining the LP varies widely across the population the gains to improv-
ing targeting are substantial. We show that targeting on spatial variables outperforms traditional
targeting strategies that rely on past spending patterns. An additional benefit of spatial targeting
is that it requires only readily available location data. We also show that the LASSO model out-
performs many other targeting strategies out of sample, thus providing reassurance to practitioners
interested in implementing this method.
Still, our analysis is not without limitations. First, we cannot guarantee that self-selection
issues have been completely eliminated. However, since most firms are unlikely to randomly enroll
customers in their loyalty programs, self-selection will likely remain a challenge in future analyses
of LP effectiveness. Second, due to the nature of the data we cannot make very strong statements
on the extent of business stealing that may be occurring. In the absence of data from multiple
competitors or direct responses from the customers themselves, we can only infer the degree of
business stealing based on changes in shopping behavior as a function of competitive structure.
We hope that our research provides the foundation for future work that integrates the complex
spatial information into models of customer behavior, especially in their relationship to making
more strategic targeting decisions.
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6 Appendix 1: Distance Metrics
In the table below, x denotes the competitor type. In our empirical application this is either the
big box generalist (BB), the small box generalists (SB1 or SB2), or the small box specialist (SS).
Distance Metric Description
si Distance between the focal store s and individual i (in km)
icx Distance between the individual and competitor x (in km)
scx Distance between the focal store and competitor x (in km)
sx Sparsity metric for competitor x, defined as scx/(icx + si)
nAll_x Total number of x competitors within the region
nd_x Total number of x competitors within d km of the individual
cIntx
Angle formed between focal store and competitor with individual at apex
(0 means s and x are in same direction relative to c
180 means s in opposite direction of x)
icbar_x
Average km between the individual and each individual competitor x
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals icx)
ccbar_x
Average km distance between each competitor and the competitive center
(if only one competitor of type x in an area, this equals 0)
Table 7: Distance Metric Descriptions
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